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Abstract
This paper inspects how comparative advantages have changed in the
last 30 years. Using trade data on 197 countries over the period 1976-
2004, it provides evidence that comparative advantages are not static,
but change over time. More interestingly, it shows the rise in relevance
of insitutional comparative advantage. Finally, it shows that this results
does not hold for some countries (BRIC).
1 Introduction and related literature
Recent literature has shown that institutional quality may be a source of com-
parative advantage in more institutionally dependent industries. Nonetheless,
this literature has provided mainly cross-sectional evidence of this phenomenon.
Levchenko (2007) shows that institutional quality gives a comparative advan-
tage in industries that produce more complex goods using a cross section. Nunn
(2007) shows that good institutions are a source of comparative advantage in
those sectors that produce more relationship-speci￿c goods. He shows that his
results are robust using data from 1963.
The aim of the present work is twofold. First, it inspects the evolution
of classical determinants of comparative advantage, namely capital and skill
endowment. Second,it shows the rise in the relevance of institutional quality
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1as an additional source of comparative advantage. Finally, it performs the
same analysis across di⁄erent subset of countries, thus highlighting di⁄erent
patterns of institutional comparative advantage. This allows to draw some
policy implications. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section
2 describes the empirical model, section 3 deals with the data and section 4
discusses the results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Speci￿cation
In his seminal article (2004), Romalis suggests what has become the standard
test for the presence of comparative advantages. His model predicts that coun-
tries capture larger shares of production in commodities that intensively use
their relatively abundant factors. In an open economy, this is re￿ ected in trade
shares. Therefore, the export performance of a country, conditional on factor
prices, should be determined by the industry input characteristics of the econ-
omy. This is close to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism for how factor
abundance causes commodity trade.
Romalis tests whether countries that are abundant in a factor of produc-
tion capture larger U.S. imports shares in industries relatively intensive in that
factor. His equation relates shares of world production to relative production
costs. A country￿ s share of world production of a commodity is decreasing in
its relative production cost. By assumption, every country has access to the
same production technology. This implies that the only cause of production
cost di⁄erences are factor price di⁄erences: countries therefore capture larger
shares of world production in commodities that intensively use their relatively
inexpensive factors.
Trade shares are explained by an interaction of factor intensities and relative
factor prices. The model assumes that there are no factor intensity reversals.
Indeed, a property of the model is that factor shares are ￿xed for each industry.
Therefore, factor intensities are derived using industry data for only one country,
the United States. Relative factor prices instead are determined by relative
factor abundance. The dependent variable in Romalis￿speci￿cation is country
c￿s share in U.S. imports in sector i divided by the average share of industry i
in U.S. imports.
Nunn (2007) suggests a more general speci￿cation. While the explanatory
variables are identical, he proposes a di⁄erent dependent variable, namely the
2logarithm of total country c￿s export in industry i to all other countries in the
world. Therefore, general exports of a country in a given industry towards the
rest of the world are supposed to be explained by comparative advantages. As
this speci￿cation is not centered on the U.S., it allows us to include also the
United States in our analysis. In the subsequent analysis Nunn￿ s speci￿cation
will be adopted. Thus, the equation that will be estimated is the following:
lnxict = ￿c+￿i+￿1insti￿instct+￿2skillit￿skillct+￿3capitalit￿capitalct+"ict
(1)
where ￿c and ￿i are country and industry dummies respectively. This dum-
mies are included to control for all unobserved characteristics at country and
industry level. Finally, it is important to note that the choice of Nunn￿ s speci-
￿cation against Romalis￿one is not too radical as it has been shown (Nicolini,
2007) that these two alternative speci￿cations are empirically equivalent.
The estimation technique chosen are ordinary least squares. Given the large
number of zeros in the dependent variable, which is typical of balanced panels
of trade data, one could opt for some re￿ned estimators.1 Nonetheless, some
problems in obtaining the convergence of estimates forced us to use standard
OLS. However, this choice should not be too problematic. OLS and alternative
estimators generally produce coe¢ cient estimates that are coherent (e.g. similar
magnitude and similar signi￿cance). While OLS could not be the best choice on
theoretical grounds, it is still by far the most widely used in empirical analysis.
Moreover, given that the analysis will focus on the changes over time in the
coe¢ cient estimates, this evolution is invariant across di⁄erent estimators.
3 Data
The dependent variable comes from the Trade, Production and Protection Data-
base, maintained by the World Bank (Nicita Olarreaga, 2006). It contains in-
formation on bilateral trade ￿ ows classi￿ed by ISIC (International Standard
Industrial Classi￿cation ), Revision 2. In order to investigate the role of com-
parative advantages we need to consider total exports of each country in each
sector. Therefore, we are not interested in the bilateral trade ￿ ows but in the
overall export ￿ ow. Thus, we construct our dependent variable by summing
1See Santos Silva Tenreyro (2006) for a comparison of di⁄erent estimators, and a suggestion
on the most appropriate econometric techniques.
3trade ￿ ows per country and sector across di⁄erent partners. We obtain a data-
base of manageable size, which contains information on exports by 197 countries
in 28 sectors, across 29 years.
Following Romalis (2004) and Nunn (2007), we assume that there are no
factor intensity reversals, thus implying that factor shares are ￿xed for each
industry across countries. Therefore, factor intensities can be ranked using
factor share data for just one country. I use U.S. industry data for reasons of
availability, moreover they are the most satisfactory, as the United States are
the largest and most diverse industrial economy.
Data for factor intensities come from the U.S. Manufacturing database main-
tained by NBER and U.S. Census Bureau￿ s Center for Economic Studies. Data
are available for the years 1976-1996, the most recent year available. capitalit
is a measure of capital intensity, and is equal to one minus the share of total
compensation in value added. skillit is a measure of skilled labour intensity, and
is equal to the ratio of non production workers to total employment, multiplied
by the total share of labour in value added, while unskillit is the intensity of
unskilled labour and is equal to the ratio of production workers to total employ-
ment multiplied by the total share of labour in value added.
Trade shares are explained by an interaction of factor intensities and rel-
ative factor prices. To determine relative factor prices we use relative factor
abundance. The endowment of skilled labour is taken from Barro Lee Database
(2000): skillct is measured al the logarithm of average schooling years in the
total population. This information is available for the period 1960-1999 with
￿ve-year frequency. The abundance of capital, capitalct, is measured by the
logarithm of the stock of capital taken from Antweiler and Tre￿ er (2002). Data
are available for the period 1972-1992.
Institutional dependence at industry level, insti, is measured using Nunn￿ s
measure, which is based on the relationship-speci￿city of each sector. Institu-
tional dependence is given by a measure of the relative weight of intermediate
inputs that are relationship-speci￿c, according to Rauch￿ s (1999) classi￿cation.
Four di⁄erent measures can be constructed, depending on the classi￿cation cho-
sen (conservative versus liberal) and the de￿nition of relationship-speci￿city
adopted (di⁄erentiated products only or di⁄erentiated products and reference
priced products).2
Measures of institutional quality, instct, are taken from the Freedom House
2See Appendix A for the de￿nition of these measures.
4Database, which provides information on political rights and civil liberties for
204 countries since 1976. These indicators are measured on a one-to-seven scale,
with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. They
have been rescaled in the interval [0,1] with increasing values associated with
highest economic freedom.
4 Results
A ￿rst attempt to size the relevance of di⁄erent sources of comparative advan-
tage is to pool together all observations, and estimate equation (1). As expected,
we ￿nd that capital and skill endowment are able to generate larger trade ￿ ows
in capital-intensive and skill-intensive industries, respectively. This is shown
in columns 1 and 2 of table 2. In other words, we ￿nd that capital and skill
endowment are sources of comparative advantage. More interestingly, columns
3 shows that also institutional quality can be a source of comparative advan-
tage in those industries that are more relationship-speci￿c. If we combine these
di⁄erent sources of comparative advantage in one estimate, we ￿nd that they
maintain their signi￿cance. These estimates are obtained including country and
sector dummies. The results are robust to the inclusion of time dummies, as
reported in column 5.
The following step in our analysis is to look for any change in comparative
advantages over time. Therefore, we estimate our equation for di⁄erent years,
and then look at any possible pattern in the coe¢ cient estimates.
Table 3 shows coe¢ cient estimates obtained regressing export ￿ ows on our
explanatory variables year by year. For each year there are 1664 observations.
Interestingly, we observe that institutional comparative advantage has gained
a signi￿cant role only in recent years. Figure 1 plots the coe¢ cient estimates
against time. This graphic representation helps in understanding the trends
in the coe¢ cient estimates. While capital seems to have an almost constant
impact in terms of comparative advantages, it is interesting to notice that skill
and institutions have gained relevance over time. This results are con￿rmed if
the analysis is performed on three- or ￿ve-year intervals.3
The next step of our analysis is to inspect whether these sources of compara-
tive advantage have a di⁄erent relevance for di⁄erent countries. The subsequent
analysis shows how comparative advantages are evolving for di⁄erent groups of
3See Figures A.1 and A.2 in Appendix.
5countries.
Firstly, our focus is on European countries. Performing the same equation
by year over di⁄erent aggregates of European countries, namely EU-12, EU-15,
Eu-25 and EU-27, we obtain a similar pattern of coe¢ cients. Capital has a
constant impact on comparative advantages, and is generally negligible. Skill
and Institutions show instead an increasing relevance as sources of comparative
advantage. These estimates are obtained using 390 observations per year. This
pattern is con￿rmed when looking at the same estimates performed on three-
year or ￿ve-year intervals.
BRICs are another group of countries for which it is interesting to inspect
the relevance of di⁄erent sources of comparative advantages. In fact, these coun-
tries, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China, have shown dramatic increases in
exports, in the recent years. Thus, it would be interesting to understand what
drives this increase.
In order to consider this smaller country aggregate I need to considers three-
year intervals. In fact, for each country there are only 28 observations on trade
￿ ows per year. Thus, to implement the analysis on smaller groups I need to
aggregate observations over time, in order to gain degrees of freedom. Moreover,
for some countries data on capital and skill endowment are not available (e.g.
capital endowment for China, capital and skill endowment for Russia). This
implies that a regression for BRIC countries that includes also capital and skill
as determinants of comparative advantages would actually be estimated only
on Brazil and India. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis I will estimate an
alternative speci￿cation:
lnxict = ￿c + ￿i + ￿1insti ￿ instct + "ict (2)
Although this choice is due to data limitations, it does not entirely com-
promise the empirical analysis, given that the main focus of the paper is on
institutional comparative advantage. Figure 3 and 4 show, respectively, the
evolution of institutional comparative advantage for EU-15 and new members
of EU, measured on a three￿ year interval. Coe¢ cient estimates for these two
groups are reported in table 5. Data show clearly two di⁄erent patterns. One
one side, EU-15 countries are slowly taking advantage of their institutional com-
parative advantage. This source of comparative advantage is gaining relevance
in European exports. On the other side, new member states￿exports do not
seem to be increasingly in￿ uenced by institutional comparative advantage. Fi-
6nally, ￿gure 5 shows the evolution of institutional comparative advantage for
BRIC countries. BRIC￿ s exports are clearly not driven by this type of com-
parative advantage. Firstly, this variable is often not signi￿cant, and therefore
does not seem to explain export ￿ ows of these countries. Moreover, when it
is signi￿cant, it looses relevance in absolute terms. This suggests that BRIC￿ s
exports are guided by other sources of comparative advantage.
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Recent literature has drawn the attention to institutional comparative advan-
tage. Nonetheless, an analysis of its role over time has not been performed
previously.
Using a rich database on sectorial export ￿ ows for 197 countries over the
period 1976-2004, we inspect the relevance of alternative determinants of com-
parative advantage. We obtain a number of interesting results.
Firstly, institutions and skill endowment seem to be the main drivers of
comparative advantages, with a growing weight in more recent years. Moreover,
if we look at di⁄erent country groups, we ￿nd that institutional comparative
advantage is relevant for European countries, while it does not seem to a⁄ect
BRIC￿ s export ￿ ows. This seems to con￿rm the common wisdom that BRIC￿ s
exports are mainly constituted of simple and cheap goods. On the other side, EU
can increase its competitiveness by capitalizing on its institutional comparative
advantage. In other words, EU countries should aim at exporting goods that
are institutionally intensive, because of their good endowment of institutional
quality.
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Tables and Figures
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(export) 159964 4.65748 5.42621 0 19.0784
insti*instc 127998 0.14233 0.11876 0 0.53137
capitali*capitalc 53534 2.36896 1.32043 -0.33217 7.89868
skilli*skillc 78442 0.13410 0.09235 -0.42513 0.51100
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
8(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
capitali*capitalc 4.280*** 4.561*** 0.111*
(0.042) (0.043) (0.058)
skilli*skillc 14.30*** 24.47*** 4.918***
(0.36) (0.55) (0.54)
insti*instc 14.95*** 8.228*** 5.678***
(0.16) (0.31) (0.28)
constant -7.661*** 4.075*** 8.242*** -15.30*** 7.035***
(0.28) (0.20) (0.20) (0.31) (0.36)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies No No No No Yes
Observations 53534 78442 127998 48256 48256
Adjusted R
2
0.59 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.67
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: Testing Comparative Advantages
9year
1976 0.589 (0.594) -0.315 (0.121)*** 0.213 (0.913)
1977 0.302 (0.887) -0.474 (0.174)*** 1.414 (1.382)
1978 0.163 (0.954) -0.413 (0.200)** 2.748 (1.529)
1979 -0.030 (1.055) -0.141 (0.198) 1.522 (1.674)
1980 -0.439 (1.023) -0.271 (0.201) 5.018 (1.865)***
1981 -0.990 (1.024) -0.151 (0.204) 7.363 (1.884)***
1982 -0.709 (1.034) -0.277 (0.190) 7.478 (1.807)***
1983 -0.713 (1.061) -0.177 (0.214) 8.894 (1.944)***
1984 0.031 (1.081) -0.239 (0.239) 7.751 (2.180)***
1985 -0.344 (1.084) -0.395 (0.217)* 8.233 (2.255)***
1986 -0.418 (1.092) -0.602 (0.219)*** 7.899 (2.167)***
1987 0.142 (1.132) -0.424 (0.239)* 7.728 (2.357)***
1988 0.311 (1.204) -0.088 (0.214) 6.068 (2.313)***
1989 1.912 (1.264) -0.171 (0.218) 6.851 (2.295)***
1990 0.142 (1.213) -0.276 (0.193) 9.734 (2.273)***
1991 -0.061 (1.095) -0.266 (0.184) 8.250 (2.177)***
1992 1.170 (1.113) -0.097 (0.196) 5.000 (2.356)**
1993 -0.022 (1.115) -0.371 (0.201)* 11.140 (2.455)***
1994 0.790 (1.041) -0.361 (0.189)* 11.658 (2.409)***
1995 1.399 (1.077) -0.430 (0.193)** 12.178 (2.611)***
1996 2.358 (1.126)** -0.559 (0.193)*** 13.561 (2.630)***
1997 1.832 (1.131) -0.469 (0.192)** 12.289 (2.613)***
1998 3.179 (1.133)*** -0.472 (0.189)** 9.457 (2.564)***
1999 3.801 (1.066)*** -0.400 (0.180)** 8.782 (2.576)***
2000 3.727 (1.204)*** -0.478 (0.205)** 10.898 (2.928)***
2001 4.011 (1.131)*** -0.431 (0.199)** 9.975 (2.850)***
2002 1.153 (1.050) -0.274 (0.188) 12.499 (2.693)***
2003 2.665 (1.103)** -0.131 (0.194) 6.547 (2.779)**
2004 2.781 (1.067)*** 0.078 (0.185) 11.526 (2.655)***
inst i*inst c capital i*capital c skill i*skill c
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%











Figure 1: Coe¢ cient Estimates Over Time, yearly
11year
1976 1.447 (3.218) -0.026 (0.266) 2.264 (3.536)
1977 1.801 (3.411) -0.292 (0.279) 1.042 (4.029)
1978 0.184 (4.373) -0.402 (0.309) 3.554 (4.298)
1979 0.038 (3.711) -0.049 (0.293) -2.845 (4.453)
1980 0.189 (3.082) -0.149 (0.276) 3.707 (4.450)
1981 0.320 (2.714) -0.164 (0.280) 3.457 (4.324)
1982 0.127 (2.619) -0.253 (0.256) 5.784 (3.973)
1983 -0.340 (2.649) -0.261 (0.288) 7.671 (4.213)*
1984 1.829 (2.637) -0.279 (0.320) 6.695 (4.641)
1985 2.009 (2.620) -0.304 (0.292) 5.612 (4.704)
1986 2.220 (2.628) -0.390 (0.298) 6.697 (4.537)
1987 2.271 (4.200) -0.423 (0.316) 8.440 (4.827)*
1988 0.769 (4.213) -0.280 (0.290) 7.214 (4.821)
1989 -0.765 (5.181) -0.291 (0.287) 9.066 (4.726)*
1990 5.716 (4.584) -0.545 (0.298) 3.659 (5.479)
1991 15.012 (4.775)*** -0.879 (0.289)*** 4.646 (5.355)
1992 8.837 (4.600)* -0.756 (0.317)** 2.312 (5.764)
1993 3.961 (3.015) -0.792 (0.328)** 0.990 (6.190)
1994 7.351 (3.474)** -0.794 (0.335)** 1.528 (6.607)
1995 9.224 (3.670)** -0.973 (0.344)*** 1.253 (6.876)
1996 11.438 (3.589)*** -1.308 (0.329)*** 3.132 (6.690)
1997 11.276 (3.373)*** -1.052 (0.309)*** 3.140 (6.287)
1998 10.770 (3.478)*** -1.086 (0.319)*** 4.713 (6.482)
1999 10.629 (3.440)*** -1.130 (0.316)*** 10.134 (7.044)
2000 9.926 (3.478)*** -1.204 (0.319)*** 11.994 (7.122)*
2001 10.575 (3.420)*** -1.214 (0.314)*** 12.157 (7.002)*
2002 22.918 (8.040)*** -0.977 (0.304)*** 13.819 (6.972)**
2003 21.188 (8.225)*** -1.008 (0.311)*** 12.826 (7.132)*
2004 20.619 (8.144)** -0.870 (0.308)*** 13.320 (7.061)*
inst i*inst c capital i*capital c skill i*skill c
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%
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Figure 5: Institutional Comparative Advantage for BRIC, three-year interval
16year
1976-78 -137.253 (13.151)*** 0.433 (0.586) 14.161 (2.583)***
1979-81 -11.448 (2.49)** 1.610 (1.580) -1.423 (1.642)
1982-84 -2.972 (2.135)** -1.286 (1.454) -0.892 (4.696)
1985-87 -0.611 (2.602)*** -0.205 (1.275) 0.352 (3.369)
1988-90 -0.607 (1.739)* 2.856 (1.305) -4.174 (1.460)***
1991-93 0.630 (1.255) 15.413 (4.039)*** -5.554 (1.424)***
1994-96 4.684 (1.598) -24.814 (4.191)*** -7.060 (6.659)
1997-99 7.097 (1.697)* 2.925 (1.806)* -4.116 (1.863)**
2000-02 3.662 (1.19) 2.518 (2.738)*** -5.331 (1.913)***
2003-04 21.080 (4.987)*** 4.224 (2.290)** -6.113 (2.366)***
EU-15 BRIC NMS
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%
Table 5: Institutional Comparative Advantage for EU-27 and BRIC
Appendix
Data Description
Nunn￿ s (2007) measure: This measure is based on Rauch￿ s classi￿cation of
goods into three groups: goods traded on an organized exchange (homogeneous
goods), reference priced and di⁄erentiated products. The classi￿cation has been
made available at 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 system. I convert this classi￿cation into
4-digit 1987 SIC and then 3-digit ISIC (rev. 3).4 I then construct a concor-
dance from the 3-digit ISIC (rev.3) classi￿cation to the IO 1992 classi￿cation.
Finally, following Nunn (2007), I construct four measures of the proportion of









































where the ￿rst two adopt Rauch￿ s conservative classi￿cation, and the follow-
ing the liberal classi￿cation. ￿ij is the ratio of the value of input j in industry i
over the total value of all inputs used in industry i. Rneither
j is the proportion
of input j that is not sold on an organized exchange, nor reference priced, while
R
ref: priced
j is the proportion of input j that is reference priced.




























































Figure A.4: Coe¢ cient Estimates Over Time for EU-27, ￿ve-year frequency
20